The much-publicised recent decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of the ischiopagus conjoined twins, Mary and Jodie, should be viewed with considerable alarm by criminal lawyers. We find the mood of the Court reminiscent of that in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland 1 . There, too, the criminal law appeared to present an inconvenient obstacle to the result desired by all the courts involved. In the case of the twins, Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) 2 , the courts have again, and again outside the context of a criminal trial, found the criminal law to be too unbending and inflexible for their purposes. The driving force behind both decisions appears to be to be seen to find a justification for the morally `soft option', giving the impression that judges now want to leave their courts bathed in the gl ow of having been seen to do what feels good to the public at large. Criminal law may be left in total disarray in consequence, but the Court of Appeal appears remarkably unconcerned on that score. In Re A, Ward L.J. observed, "The search for settled legal principle has been especially arduous and conducted under real pressure of time"
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[1993] 1 All E.R. 821. Anthony Bland was 21, but for three years had been in a persistent vegetative state following catastrophic injury at the disaster at the Hillsborough Football Stadium in 1989. The family and medical team sought a declaration that it would be lawful not to replace the nasogastric tubes through which he was fed, nor to provide antibiotic treatment. The Courts at all levels held that this would be lawful in this case. Appeal to impose its will on the children's parents, who live outside its jurisdiction and will have to bear the consequences in terms of caring for the surviving twin. Their belief that the operation was morally wrong was supported by advice from their Church. Thus the Court's decision overrode both the moral views of the children's parents and established criminal law doctrine.
The cost is high -hard cases are known to make bad law. The alterations made in Re A to the doctrine of necessity not only create enormous uncertainty; they will inevitably draw criminal courts into many cases involving difficult moral issues. The defence of necessity works in this way. If the law does not recognize the defence in a murder case (which previously it most certainly did not), the judge will not allow the jury to consider it. It is not legally available as a defence. But where it is a legal defence, the jury has to decide whether the killing was genuinely necessary. They must consider the nature of the emergency and whether means other than killing were available to deal with it. 8 . How would a jury respond to that defence being raised where the killing was an act of mercy? Is it now the case that a trial judge would have to allow the jury to return a verdict of not guilty where they are persuaded that death was `necessary' as euthanasia? The Court of Appeal has opened the door to lawful acquittal where euthanasia is the reason for a killing, and it could be only a matter of time before such cases are before the courts.
All this is the inevitable consequence of distorting the law in order to achieve a utilitarian goal where two lives are at stake. To achieve the `feel-good' result in a very unusual case, we are at risk of having to condone euthanasia by private citizens who raise the defence of necessity. However, my main argument here is that there is more wrong with Re A than the blatant distortion of the general defences that exist in 8 Martin [1989] 1 All E.R. 652: Conway [1989] 3 All E.R. 1025 criminal law. For, in addition to that, the Court of Appeal attempt to disguise the fact that at every point of their argument they are engaged in a comparison of the respective rights to life of two human beings. The judges, while apparently giving every consideration to Mary's right to life, and while acknowledging the flaws in the reasoning employed in Bland, adopt an interpretation of the decision which renders her interests to the periphery of the inquiry and which must raise questions as to how much value the common law attaches to the sanctity of life. It is proposed to in this paper to examine the analysis of murder offered in Re A. This, I suggest, will show that Bland charted the wrong course and that the title of Finnis' note, `Crossing the Rubicon' 9 was well chosen.
LIFE IN BEING
In neither Bland nor Re A would the courts take the route of deciding that the person about whom the declaration was sought did not amount to a life in being capable of protection by the criminal law. Only in Re A was the matter specifically addressed, 10 apparently because of the view of some doctors that Mary could be regarded as equivalent to a deformity on Jodie's body. Many of us in fact would be revolted by the implication that we can classify who is and who is not a human being on the basis of some medical judgment about the number of functioning organs or the capacity to feel sensation. Brooke L.J. made the court's view clear: "In this context other, and consequential erosion in our courts of the principle of the sanctity of life.
Finnis has shown how unconvincing is the claim made in Bland that the courts will not involve themselves in eugenics.
ANALOGY WITH BLAND
To prove murder by the doctors, a prosecutor would have to show that they performed an act, or omitted to act where they have a duty to act, in a fashion which caused the death of Mary, and that they had the intention to kill or cause her really serious harm.
The approach of Johnson J. at first instance in Re A was to develop an analogy with Bland to show that the proposed surgery would not be criminal. Does an analogy stand up?
1. Could it be said that by removing the `life-support system' provided by Jodie, the hospital would not be performing a positive act but omitting to act? It has frequently been stated that there is a vital distinction between acts and omissions; a positive act that kills cannot be justified even when in the best interests of the patient.
However much a patient's continued existence is not in her best interests, a doctor apparently is not allowed to perform a positive act, which kills her. In Bland it was recognised that there is no moral difference between such an act and an omission with the same effect, and that the law's refusal to countenance the former is a matter of policy. Nevertheless, the House of Lords relied on the distinction to justify its decision.
The lack of any logical or ethical rationale for the positive act/omission dichotomy was In Bland the proposed course of action was difficult to categorise as either an omission to act or a positive act. Would the cause of death be the removal of the old feeding-tube, the failure to insert a new one, or the failure to supply nutrition through the tube? The general view was that it would be absurd if culpability rested on such categorisat ion.
The fact that there was to be a positive act, the removal of tube, should not define the procedure as homicide. Whatever one may feel about the wisdom of relying on the classification of nasogastric feeding as medical treatment, the problems in Re A were very different; could it be argued with at least equal validity that the supply of oxygen to Mary' s body from a heart and pair of lungs which were not her own amounted to medical treatment? And although the distinction between acts and omissions is logically unsound and morally irrelevant, it performs a vital function for as long as the courts insist that they cannot condone euthanasia. The elastic nature of omission in law gave the court ample opportunity in Re A to justify the operation to separate the twins and seems no more irrational than to overrule Dudley and Stephens with no attention to its ratio decidendi.
However, it was held in Re A that the proposed surgery would be a positive act, in that it would represent an invasion of Mary's bodily integrity 26 .
There is a second and significant aspect to this discussion. It emerged in Re A that Mary's life could be saved if she were placed on a heart and lung machine after separation from Jodie. The hospital said that this would not be normal practice.
It is not something that we would have planned as part of the procedure because this is the sort of situation that one would set up if one was looking towards a survivor. It is a holding situation…Unless there was a heart and lungs available for transplant instantly there would not really be all that much point, and then one has to take into context the rest of the problems which the child has, which 26 Re A, per Ward L.J. at 993 really do not suggest that there is any point taking on a heart/lung transplant for this child 27 .
If she were to be placed on such a machine, said the Court of Appeal, the hospital could subsequently remove it from her on the principles set out in Bland. "If her life were being supported, not by Jodie, but by mechanical means, it would be right to withdraw that artificial life-support system and allow Mary to die" 28 . Hence there was apparently little point in using the machine in the first place.
Here we can see that although the Court of Appeal claimed that it did not rely on the positive act/omission distinction, insofar as it underpins the decision in Bland, the Court is forced in this argument to fall back on it. Their Lordships effectively leap-frog the direct effect of the operation, which is immediate death, into a Bland analogy in which the hospital would merely be ceasing to treat. In doing so, they transform a positive act that kills Mary into an omission to act. The same problem informs their use of the necessity defence as the justification for the surgery; there would be no necessity in killing Mary if her life could be saved afterwards. However, the Court decided that it could not, because in the final analysis, the means of saving her could be denied her on Bland principles.
The withdrawal of life support from Mary would be in her best interests
In Bland, the House of Lords appeared to feel justified in discounting the principle of the sanctity of life against their Lordships' interpretation of the patient's best interests. It was suggested in Bland that there was something undignified about the fact that the hospital was keeping treating its young patient alive. It is not clear why this view was taken, and certainly not why it was apparently thought that the manner of his treatment robbed him of dignity.
In Bland the hospital could not point to any risk or futility in the treatment he was receiving. Here the reasoning of the court centred not on whether the treatment was where another life could be saved, and even if the other's life is likely to be short or uncomfortable. That would be to ask the courts to a judgment as to which human life should be preferred over another.
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In Re A the Court of Appeal recognized the strength of the criticisms of the `quality of life' argument, and agreed that it could not be said that it was in Mary's best interests to be killed. She was quite comfortable 43 . Why then, would it be pointless to keep her on a heart and lung machine? Why was it assumed that removal of the machine would 3. Could it be said that that the operation would not cause death?
Unfortunately the criminal cases on causation are far from clear on the subject of hospitals who fail to treat disease or injury (either correctly or at all). In general, however, negligent treatment will not break the chain of causation where an individual inflicted the original injury. That person will therefore be held to have caused the death and be culpable. This is the case even where the doctor has a duty to treat the injury.
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Yet in Bland, judges were divided as to whether it could be said that once nasogastric feeding were discontinued, the cause of death would be Anthony Bland's original injuries rather than the hospital failure to treat him. Sir Stephen Brown considered that if the feeding tubes were removed, the true cause of Anthony Bland's death would be "the massive injuries which he sustained…in the Hillsborough disaster."
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There was some agreement with this in the Court of Appeal; "The withdrawal of nasogastric feeding would amount to an omission to act which would allow causes already present in the body to operate and the introduction of an external agency of death. Without the tube he would have died from his medical condition "
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. But the logic of this argument would remove any need for a judicial declaration authorising the discontinuance of treatment in cases of this kind. Any hospital could make the decision entirely on its own responsibility, claiming that the consequent death was caused by the disease or injury.
In such a context there would be no need to consider the issue of the patient's best interests at all. . There is a positive duty of humanity, to provide basic nourishment, where there is a duty of care and someone is helpless. In the same way, if someone is ill and that duty exists, the carer cannot simply withhold it and say the illness caused the death. As far as withholding medical treatment is concerned, as Kennedy and Grubb point out 48 there are some patients who will in fact die of the disease or injury, but others who will not. Patients in a persistent vegetative state fall into the latter category. , currently the leading case on the mens rea for murder, would be satisfied.
But the Woollin test is less than clear-cut. Evidence that a defendant foresaw death or really serious bodily harm is evidence from which a jury may, not must, infer intention. The state of mind which a prosecutor must prove in relation to a particular offence 55 Although Lord Bingham M.R. suggested that the doctors would not have the required mens rea, but he gave no explanation of this: Bland, supra, at 841 56 The Archbishop of Westminster had explained that the doctrine of double effect did not assist: the good end (to save Jodie) did not justify the means (killing Mary). See also S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, op.cit. 57 [1998] 4 All E. R. 103 There is before the jury, then, a "get-out" clause whereby they may decide that although a defendant foresaw death as virtually certain, he or she did not intend it. The House of Lords gave no guidance as to when a jury might legitimately do this. William Wilson suggests that the presence of `good motive' might be a justification for an acquittal on the grounds that there was no intention. In his example, a motorist driving with reasonable care along a narrow mountain cliff turns a bend and discovers a bunch of hikers stretched out across the road. Lacking time to brake, his options are to carry on, plunging into the group at the likely cost of causing death, or to drive off the cliff "in heroic self sacrifice". . That seems to miss the point that the case establishes only the basis on which a jury is entitled to infer intention. It does not define intention. The problem presented by Woollin is in fact a different one. It stems from the fact that Re A concerned a hypothetical rather than an actual trial for murder. If Mary's surgeons were tried for murder, the jury would make a decision on the facts as to whether intent was present at the time of the operation. They would be likely to conclude that the surgeons foresaw Re A, supra,, at 1029 the jury would resolve the issue. Even if there were no doubt but that the jury would acquit of murder (because of lack of intention), a difficulty remains. Intention is not required to sustain a verdict of manslaughter, and so the surgeons of St Mary's would be at risk of a manslaughter conviction were they to rely for their defence on denial of mens rea alone. And, of course, had Mary been transferred to heart and lung machine on a temporary basis, removal from it would have been accompanied by a clear intention, since there would be no higher purpose than to let her die.
CONCLUSION
The appeal judges in this case stress that they wish to take Mary's rights seriously. In defence of those rights they claim to eschew an analogy with Bland. Yet the Court accepted, apparently without question, the medical view that there was no purpose to be served by keeping her alive after the operation. It was taken as read that any artificial means of sustaining her could legally be withdrawn at any or at some time subsequently. This assumption is fundamental to the court' s espousal of the necessity defence in this case. For if there were means of saving Mary, her death would not be the necessary price to pay for saving Jodie. However, the assumption that she was doomed is based on an undeveloped comparison wit h Bland. Although the Court of Appeal was aware the flaws in that judgment, it became embroiled in precisely the same contradictions and moral fudging. However, that enables the Court of Appeal to achieve a utilitarian goal (saving one life rather than lose two lives) while talking in terms of the right to life and the sanctity of life. It also allows the judges to impose their views upon parents from outside the jurisdiction, although those views are highly questionable in terms of law, logic and morality. Some of us may read this case and find that we do not feel particularly good, after all.
